Empathy, Dehumanization, and Misperceptions: A Media Intervention Humanizes Migrants and Increases Empathy for Their Plight but Only if Misinformation About Migrants Is Also Corrected

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Abstract

Anti-migrant policies at the U.S. southern border have resulted in the separation and long-term internment of thousands of migrant children and the deaths of many migrants. What leads people to support such harsh policies? Here we examine the role of two prominent psychological factors—empathy and dehumanization. In Studies 1 and 2, we find that empathy and dehumanization are strong, independent predictors of anti-migrant policy support and are associated with factually false negative beliefs about migrants. In Study 3, we interrogated the relationship between empathy/dehumanization, erroneous beliefs, and anti-migrant policy support with two interventions: a media intervention targeting empathy and dehumanization and an intervention that corrects erroneous beliefs. Both interventions were ineffective separately but reduced anti-migrant policy support when presented together. These results suggest a synergistic relationship between psychological processes and erroneous beliefs that together drive harsh anti-migrant policy support.

Keywords

migrants, empathy, dehumanization, intervention

Despite being a “nation of immigrants,” the United States has a long history of discrimination against migrants and refugees (Young, 2017). Recently, there has been an increase in policies designed to deter immigration, especially at the U.S. southern border (American Immigration Council, 2020). Although the influx of undocumented migrants into the United States through its southern border is at a 20-year low (Radford, 2019), the previous administration has expressed concern that “the United States of America has been invaded by hundreds of thousands of people coming through Mexico and entering our country illegally” (The White House, 2019) and has enacted anti-migrant policies to restrain immigration, including the systematic removal of migrant children from their families and their long-term detention in internment camps (Dickerson, 2019). What leads Americans to support or oppose such policies?

One potential driver of anti-migrant policy support is dehumanization. Dehumanization is associated with unwillingness to help others, including immigrants (Bruneau et al., 2018; Esses et al., 2013; Rowatt et al., 2020), and an increased willingness to support punishment and harm (Bruneau & Kteily, 2017; Haslam, 2006; Kteily et al., 2015; Utych, 2018), especially toward those deemed harm-worthy (Haslam et al., 2012). By contrast, empathy increases the desire to help and reduces support for causes of suffering (Batson, 2009; Batson & Ahmad, 2009; Stephan & Finlay, 1999). But empathy is often reserved for those we believe are “worthy” (Bandura, 2002; Opotow, 1990; Zaki, 2014): to those who are virtuous and similar to us or our in-groups (e.g., Cikara et al., 2011; Stürmer et al., 2006). Taken together, we predict that people who overestimate the prevalence of unworthy behaviors among undocumented migrants (e.g., using children as props; gang membership) will dehumanize migrants more and express less...
We excluded 212 participants for failing the embedded attention research organization NORC at the University of Chicago. We recruited 1,265 people (unweighted) from the nonpartisan thy toward migrants through a media intervention. In Study 3, we sought to intervene in these relationships by correcting overestimates and/or inducing empathy and determined how strongly empathy and dehumanization are associated with estimates of migrant criminality and anti-migrant policy support. In Study 3, we sought to intervene in these relationships by correcting overestimates and/or inducing empathy toward migrants through a media intervention.

Study 1

Method

Participants

We recruited 1,265 people (unweighted) from the nonpartisan research organization NORC at the University of Chicago. We excluded 212 participants for failing the embedded attention check (“Please select 5 for this question.”) and 32 participants who did not follow instructions (i.e., participants who indicated over 100% for the estimates), resulting in a final unweighted sample of 1,021. Ultimately, 1,009 participants (weighted) were included in the final sample (560 Democrats, 449 Republicans), which approximated U.S. demographics by race (66% White, 15% Black, 15% Latinx, 2% Asian, and 2% Other), gender (54% female), age (M = 47.56 years, SD = 16.62), and U.S. geographic region (17% Northeast, 23% Midwest, 38% South, and 22% West). (See Supplemental Table S1 for Study demographic details compared to benchmarks.) We use weighted values in all Study 1 analyses.

Measures and Procedure

We report all measures, manipulations, and exclusions in all studies.

Beliefs About Migrant Criminality

Participants read the following prompt:

“Many people who do not currently have immigration documentation to enter the U.S. (“undocumented migrants”) are trying to gain entry into the U.S. by crossing the Southern Border. Three reasons why people may seek to gain entry is because they are (1) gang members who intend to extend their criminal influence, (2) asylum seekers who are trying to flee violence and oppression and save themselves and their families, or (3) economic migrants who are trying to find work.”

Participants were then asked to estimate the percentage of undocumented migrants at the southern border who belong to each of these three groups (in random order).

We then asked participants to estimate the percentage of migrant children at the southern border who are being used by adults who are not their parents: “There have been stories of undocumented migrant adults using children (who are not their own) to gain entry at the U.S. southern border” and then asked to “estimate the percent (%) of migrant children at the southern border who are being used as props by adults who are not their parents.”

Dehumanization

We measured the dehumanization of undocumented migrants (and filler groups in randomized order) with the “Ascent of (Hu)Man” Scale (Kteily et al., 2015), which asked participants to provide humanity judgments using a sliding scale spanned by the Ascent of (Hu)Man diagram. We anchored responses at the 0 = least evolved/civilized and 100 = most evolved/civilized sides of the image. We reverse-coded the scores for “undocumented migrants” such that higher scores indicate greater dehumanization.

Anti-Migrant Policies

We assessed anti-migrant policy support with five randomized items including three policies implemented by the Trump
administration (e.g., “Any person who crosses the border illegally with a child should be separated from that child for court processing”) and two policies favored by the Obama administration (e.g., “Deportation should only be enforced for people who threaten national security and public safety”; see Supplemental Materials for all items). Participants responded using a Likert-type scale anchored at 1 = strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree (α = .84; for similar measures, see Bruneau et al., 2018; Kteily et al., 2015).

### Demographics

Participants answered demographic questions about their race, gender, geographic region, and political affiliation. We consider as Democrat all participants who indicated strong Democrat, weak Democrat, or lean Democrat, and we consider as Republican all participants who indicated strong Republican, weak Republican, and lean Republican.

### Results

For means, standard deviations, and correlations, see Table 1.

We first examined the penetrance of narratives about criminality and immorality of undocumented migrants. On average, participants perceived that 15.42% (SD = 16.69%) of migrants crossing the southern border are gang-affiliated; by political party, Democrats estimated 10.49% (SD = 13.77%), and Republicans estimated 21.56% (SD = 17.94%). Although Republicans’ estimates were significantly greater than Democrats’ estimates, t(1,007) = 11.08, p < .001, d = .69, 95% confidence interval (CI) [9.10, 13.02], mean estimates by both groups were nearly an order of magnitude greater than the ~1% of undocumented migrants who are suspected by the DHS of being associated in some way with a gang (Chinoy et al., 2018; one-sample t tests: Democrat: t(559) = 16.31, p < .001, d = .69, 95% CI [8.35, 10.64]; Republican: t(448) = 24.28, p < .001, d = 1.15, 95% CI [18.89, 22.22]; full sample: t(1,008) = 27.44, p < .001, d = .86, 95% CI [13.39, 15.45]). Overall, 86% of participants numerically overestimated the percentage of migrants associated with gangs (78% of Democrats, 95% of Republicans; see Figure 1).

For the second estimate, participants predicted, on average, that 26.55% (SD = 25.80%) of undocumented children are being used as props to gain entry into the United States: Democrats estimated 18.35% (SD = 22.94%), and Republicans estimated 36.78% (SD = 25.54%). Again, although Republicans’ estimates were significantly greater than Democrats’ estimates, t(1,008) = 27.44, p < .001, d = .86, 95% CI [13.39, 15.45]). Overall, 86% of participants numerically overestimated the percentage of migrant children being trafficked (94% of Democrats and 99% of Republicans; see Figure 1).

Consistent with our predictions, using Hayes’s (2018) PROCESS Version 3.5 (Model 4), we found an indirect effect of gang member estimates on anti-migrant policies through dehumanization (indirect effect = .05, Boot SE = .01, 95%...
CI [.03, .08]) and an indirect effect of estimates of children used as props on anti-migrant policies through dehumanization (indirect effect = .06, Boot SE = .01, 95% CI [.04, .08]; see Figure S1). Furthermore, as shown in Table 1B, correlations between all of the variables were generally stronger among Democrats than Republicans. This was also reflected in the following analyses.

In particular, we examined whether the indirect effects were moderated by political affiliation using Hayes’s (2018) PROCESS Version 3.5 (Model 59). There was a significant moderated indirect effect of gang member estimates on anti-migrant policies through dehumanization (index = −.05, Boot SE = .02, 95% CI [−.09, −.01]); indirect effects were significant for Democrats (effect = .06, Boot SE = .02, 95% CI [.03, .10]) but not Republicans (effect = .01, Boot SE = .01, 95% CI [−.01, .03]). There was not a significant moderated indirect effect of child prop estimates on anti-migrant policies through dehumanization (index = −.03, Boot SE = .02, 95% CI [−.07, .01]), but there was a significant indirect effect for both Democrats (effect = .06, Boot SE = .02, 95% CI [.03, .10]) and Republicans (effect = .03, Boot SE = .01, 95% CI [.01, .05]). However, the pattern of results was consistent—indirect effects among Republicans were descriptively smaller. For complete indirect effect analyses, moderation indirect effect analyses and reverse indirect effects path models, see Supplemental Materials.

Discussion

Among a representative sample of Americans, both Democrats and Republicans significantly overestimate the types of migrants entering the United States through its southern border. Estimates of gang member affiliates were over 15-fold greater than DHS statistics, and the mean percentage of children estimated to be used as props was over 250-fold greater than DHS statistics. We also found that individual differences in overestimations predicted support for policies through their associations with dehumanization. Results suggest that erroneous beliefs about migrant criminality are associated with the dehumanization of migrants, particularly among Democrats. In Study 2, we sought to replicate Study 1 effects and extend our analysis to include empathy and dehumanization as parallel predictors of anti-migrant policy support.

Study 2

Method

Participants

We recruited 1,439 participants from a Qualtrics panel to complete this Study. We excluded 260 participants for failing the attention check (“Please answer ‘strongly agree’ for this question.”), resulting in 1,179 participants in the final sample (607 Democrats, 562 Republicans), which approximated U.S. census proportions by gender (44% female), age (M = 48.12 years; SD = 17.88), geographic region (Northwest: 19%, Midwest: 20%, South: 38%, and West: 23%), but not race (79% White, 7% Black, 7% Latinx, 4% Asian, and 3% Other).

Measures and Procedure

Estimations

We assessed estimates of gang members and children used as props as in Study 1.

Dehumanization

To obtain a more comprehensive measure of dehumanization, we included two counterbalanced measures: The Ascent of (Hu)Man Scale (Kteily et al., 2015), as in Study 1, and a multi-item blatant dehumanization measure, in which participants rated “illegal/undocumented migrants” on 16 traits (e.g., primitive, aggressive, barbaric; see Supplemental Materials for all items) using a 0 = not at all to 7 = extremely so Likert-type scale. We averaged responses across traits to create a multi-item dehumanization score (α = .79). We computed an overall dehumanization score by averaging both standardized dehumanization scores (Kteily et al., 2016).

Empathy Toward Migrants

Participants indicated their empathy levels toward migrants with three questions: “How much empathy do you feel for parents whose children are taken from them as they cross into the U.S.?” “How much empathy do you feel for children who are taken from their parents when they try to cross into the U.S.?” “How much empathy do you feel for migrants at the southern border, in general?” Participants used a sliding scale anchored at 0 = none and 100 = a lot. We averaged these ratings to create an overall empathy score (α = .92; for similar measures, see Bruneau et al., 2015; Bruneau & Kteily, 2017).
Table 2. Study 2 Correlations and Descriptive Statistics.

### A. Overall

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<td>1. Percentage of gang members</td>
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<td>2. Percentage of children props</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Dehumanization</td>
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<td>4. Empathy</td>
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<td>5. Anti-migrant policies</td>
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Overall M (SD) 15.76 (17.67) 34.77 (30.37) −.01 (87) 64.36 (32.05) 3.63 (1.40)

### B. Democrats and Republicans

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<td>1. Percentage of gang members</td>
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<td>3. Dehumanization</td>
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Democrats M (SD) 10.91 (14.68) a 24.08 (26.26) a −.29 (.78) a 80.01 (23.80) a 2.92 (1.21) a

Republicans M (SD) 21.02 (18.95) b 46.40 (30.27) b .32 (.86) b 47.83 (31.23) b 4.39 (1.16) b

Note. For section B, above the horizontal line are Republican correlations, and below the horizontal line are Democrat correlations; a and b superscript comparisons are within variable; values that share the same superscript did not differ from each other (t test p > .05), and values with different superscripts differed from each other (t test p < .05).

***p < .001.

Anti-Migrant Policies

We assessed anti-migrant policy support as in Study 1 but with a slightly modified set of seven randomized items (e.g., “The United States should enforce a ‘zero-tolerance’ policy in which all unauthorized people crossing the border should be criminally prosecuted”; see Supplemental Materials; see Bruneau et al., 2018; Kteily et al., 2015). Responses were made on a 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree Likert-type scale (α = .83).

Results

For means, standard deviations, and correlations, see Table 2.

As in Study 1, we found that participants overestimated illegal/immoral behavior by migrants. On average, participants believed that 15.76% (SD = 17.67%) of migrants crossing the southern border were gang-affiliated: Democrats estimated 10.91% (SD = 14.68%), and Republicans estimated 21.02% (SD = 18.95%). Democrats’ and Republicans’ estimates significantly differed from each other, t(1,167) = 10.24, p < .001, d = .60, 95% CI [8.17, 12.05], but both groups’ mean estimates were greater than the ~1% of undocumented migrants who are suspected of being associated in some way with a gang. Democrat: t(606) = 16.63, p < .001, d = .68, 95% CI [8.74, 11.08]; Republican: t(561) = 25.04, p < .001, d = 1.06, 95% CI [18.45, 21.59]; full sample: t(1,178) = 28.67, p < .001, d = .68, 95% CI [13.75, 15.77]. Overall, 79% of participants numerically overestimated the percentage of migrants associated with gangs (68% of Democrats and 92% of Republicans; see Figure 2).

Similar to Study 1, participants predicted, on average, that 34.77% (SD = 30.37%) of children crossing the southern border are being used as props to gain entry into the United States: Democrats estimated 24.08% (SD = 26.26%), and Republicans estimated 46.40% (SD = 30.27%). Although estimates by Democrats and Republicans significantly differed from each other, t(1,167) = 13.49, p < .001, d = .79, 95% CI [19.07, 25.56], estimates by both groups were significantly greater than the <.1% of migrant children actually suspected by the DHS of being used by nonparents to gain entry into the U.S., Democrat: t(606) = 22.50, p < .001, d = .91, 95% CI [21.89, 26.07]; Republican: t(561) = 36.26, p < .001, d = 1.53, 95% CI [43.79, 48.80]; full sample: t(1,178) = 39.19, p < .001, d = 1.14, 95% CI [32.94, 36.41]. Overall, 93% of participants overestimated the percentage of migrant children being trafficked (88% of Democrats and 98% of Republicans; see Figure 2).

Consistent with our predictions and Study 1, we found a significant indirect effect of the gang member estimate on anti-migrant policy support, this time in parallel through both dehumanization (indirect effect = .07, Boot SE = .01, 95% CI [.05, .10]) and empathy (indirect effect = .22, Boot SE = .02, 95% CI [.19, .26]) and also an indirect effect of estimates of children used as props on anti-migrant policies in parallel through dehumanization (indirect effect = .07, Boot SE = .01, 95% CI [.05, .10]) and empathy (indirect effect = .28, Boot SE = .02, 95% CI [.24, .32]; see Figure S10).
Furthermore, as shown in Table 2B, and consistent with Study 1, correlations between all variables were generally stronger among Democrats than Republicans, which was also reflected in the following analyses.

In particular, we examined whether these indirect effects were moderated by political affiliation. First, there was a significant moderated indirect effect of gang member estimates on anti-migrant policies through dehumanization (index = −.07, Boot SE = .03, 95% CI [−.14, −.01]); indirect effects were significant for Democrats (effect = .17, Boot SE = .03, 95% CI [.12, .23]) and Republicans, albeit descriptively weaker (effect = .10, Boot SE = .02, 95% CI [.06, .14]). However, moderated indirect effects of gang member estimates on anti-migrant policies through empathy were not significant (index = −.04, Boot SE = .02, 95% CI [−.08, .01]). Yet, the pattern of results for the indirect effects was similar—indirect effects were significant for Democrats (effect = .08, Boot SE = .02, 95% CI [.05, .12]) and Republicans, albeit descriptively weaker (effect = .04, Boot SE = .01, 95% CI [.02, .07]).

Likewise, there was a significant moderated indirect effect of child prop estimates on anti-migrant policies through dehumanization (index = −.05, Boot SE = .02, 95% CI [−.10, −.01]); indirect effects were significant for Democrats (effect = .09, Boot SE = .02, 95% CI [.05, .13]) and Republicans, albeit descriptively weaker (effect = .04, Boot SE = .01, 95% CI [.02, .06]). Again, moderated indirect effects of child prop estimates on anti-migrant policies through empathy were not significant (index = −.03, Boot SE = .03, 95% CI [−.09, .04]), with similar significant indirect effects for Democrats (effect = .19, Boot SE = .03, 95% CI [.14, .24]) and Republicans, albeit descriptively weaker (effect = .16, Boot SE = .02, 95% CI [.12, .20]). See Supplemental Materials for complete indirect effect analyses, and reverse indirect effect path models.

Discussion
As predicted, Studies 1 and 2 established the importance of dehumanization and empathy in anti-migrant policy support: together, empathy and dehumanization explained over 50% of the variance ($R^2 = .60$) in anti-migrant policy support. In addition, we found that the degree to which Americans, especially Democrats, considered migrants to be fully “evolved and civilized” and their willingness to empathize with migrants were contingent upon (over)estimates of the proportion of migrants thought to be gang members and the proportion of children thought to be trafficked to gain easier entry. We aimed to intervene on these relationships in Study 3.

Study 3
In Study 3, we explored the relationships between (over)estimates of migrants’ illegal/immoral activity, empathy/dehumanization, and anti-migrant policy support using two interventions. Previous research demonstrates that if empathy is successfully mobilized for an out-group member, it can increase positive affect and attitudes toward the out-group as a whole (Batson et al., 1997, 2002; Shih et al., 2009); this may be particularly true if the narrative focuses on the mind of the target (i.e., their thoughts and emotions; Bruneau et al., 2015). To induce empathy, we used a 2-minute video (player.vimeo.com/video/288249520) depicting the emotional reunion of an undocumented mother and her child after they had been separately detained for months. Since the mother expresses a range of human-specific emotions (e.g., love, remorse, shame), we assumed that the video would also reduce dehumanization.

However, this strategy’s effectiveness depends upon the target of the narrative being viewed as representative of the group (Brown & Hewstone, 2005). If a sympathetic out-group member is perceived to be an exception to a generally unsympathetic group, then positive responses to the individual may not immediately translate to positive responses toward the group they represent (Baston et al., 1997). Since Studies 1 and 2 showed that Americans consistently and dramatically overestimate undocumented migrants’ illegal/immoral behavior, we hypothesized that any effects of an empathy-inducing media intervention may be enhanced by challenging beliefs about migrants that may render them unworthy of empathic concern. Thus, in addition to this more affective video intervention, we created a brief cognitive intervention that aimed to correct the (over)estimates of migrant criminality. In this intervention, participants made each of the two estimates, as in Studies 1 and 2, and immediately after each estimate, they were provided with the actual percentage of migrants suspected of being associated with a gang (≈1%) or the actual percentage of children suspected of being used or trafficked by adults who were not their parents (<1%) from DHS statistics. We tested these intervention...
strategies in an experimental paradigm with five conditions: video only, statistical correction only, video + statistical correction (two versions with order counterbalanced), and no intervention control.

**Method**

**Participants**

We recruited 994 participants from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk to complete this study. We excluded 36 participants for failing the attention check (“Please answer ‘strongly agree’ for this question.”), resulting in 958 participants (53% female; Mage = 35.38 years, SD = 11.28; 65% Democrat, 35% Republican; 67% White, 15% Black, 6% Latinx, 8% Asian, and 4% Other) in the final sample (see Supplemental Materials for condition demographics).

**Measures and Procedure**

After providing consent, participants were randomly assigned to one of five conditions: statistical correction only (n = 198), video only (n = 189), statistical correction + video (Order 1; n = 190), video + statistical correction (Order 2; n = 187), and control (n = 194). In the statistical correction condition, participants first provided the same gang member and children used as props estimates as in Studies 1 and 2, and immediately after providing their estimates, they were shown the actual DHS data as described above. In the video condition, participants watched a video, as described above, and then provided the two estimates about gang members and migrant children but did not receive the DHS data. In the control condition, participants made estimates but did not receive DHS data and were not shown the video. All participants then completed the same empathy (α = .90), dehumanization (multi-item: α = .91), and anti-migrant policies (α = .83) measures as in Study 2.

**Results**

For correlations, see Table 3. We first conducted planned contrasts to determine the effect of each intervention condition versus the control on the outcome variables (see Figure 3). For the combined intervention, we found no significant differences for any of the outcome variables between the counterbalanced conditions (all ps > .239); we therefore combined them for all analyses.

For the combined video and statistical correction condition, participants demonstrated less dehumanization of migrants, t(954) = −2.96, p = .003, d = .26; greater empathy toward migrants, t(954) = 2.46, p = .014, d = .22; and less anti-migrant policy support, t(954) = −2.38, p = .018, d = .21, as compared to the control condition.

For the video-only condition, participants dehumanized migrants less than those in the control condition, t(954) = −2.02, p = .044, d = .20. However, there was no difference in empathy for migrants, t(954) = 1.31, p = .191, d = .13, or anti-migrant policy support, t(954) = −.78, p = .437, d = .08, as compared to the control.

For the statistical correction-only condition, compared to the control condition, there was no difference in dehumanization of migrants, t(954) = −1.90, p = .057, d = .19; empathy toward migrants, t(954) = 1.11, p = .268, d = .11; or anti-migrant policy support, t(954) = −1.09, p = .276, d = .11.

We then examined whether the successful intervention condition (statistical correction + video) versus the control affected anti-migrant policy support through empathy and
dehumanization using Hayes’s (2018) PROCESS Version 3.5 (Model 4). We found parallel indirect effects of both empathy and dehumanization on the relationship between the video + statistical correction intervention versus the control on the policy outcome (dehumanization: indirect effect = −.03, Boot SE = .01, 95% CI [−.06, −.01]; empathy: indirect effect = −.04, Boot SE = .01, 95% CI [−.07, −.01]; see Figure 4). These indirect effects were not moderated by political affiliation (ps > .05; see Supplemental Materials). Since the statistical correction intervention provided the correct statistics after participants provided their own estimates, we could not determine the effect of the intervention on estimates.

**Discussion**

Study 3 was designed to experimentally examine the relationship between the estimated prevalence of immoral/illegal behavior among migrants, empathy toward/dehumanization of migrants, and anti-migrant policy support. These results demonstrate that providing Americans, regardless of political affiliation, with a narrative depicting the suffering of migrants can humanize and induce empathy toward migrants, thereby decreasing anti-migrant policy support. This is as long as the media intervention is accompanied by an intervention that provides corrective information about the general lack of migrant gang members and the paucity of children being used by adults to gain entry. We suggest that the correction of statistical information renders undocumented migrants more worthy of regard and empathetic engagement in the minds of participants and allows empathy for an undocumented mother and child to extend to other undocumented migrants.

**General Discussion**

Here we found that Americans estimated the percentage of migrants who are gang-affiliated to be 15 times greater than reported by the U.S. DHS and estimated the percentage of children being used by adults who are not their parents to be 250 times greater than reported by the DHS. These overestimations had serious implications, as they were associated with anti-migrant policy support through their effects on empathy and dehumanization. These associations between the overestimations and the outcome measures, and correspondingly, the indirect effects, were not consistently significantly moderated by political affiliation (perhaps because the studies were not sufficiently powered to detect such interaction; Giner-Sorolla, 2018). However, these effects were consistently stronger for Democrats than for Republicans. Arguably, this could be because Republicans generally harbor more negative views toward migrants, including higher levels of dehumanization and lower levels of empathy (e.g., Bruneau et al., 2018), due to different psychological factors such as higher levels of hierarchy enforcing beliefs (i.e., social dominance orientation; Ho et al., 2015) and greater feelings of threat by migrants (e.g., Esses et al., 2013). Therefore, we argue that inaccurate estimates of migrant criminality are less consequential for Republicans than Democrats when predicting empathy, dehumanization, and anti-migrant policy support.

In Study 3, we sought to intervene on these attitudes by (1) presenting participants with DHS statistics about the types of migrants entering the U.S. southern border and (2) inducing empathy toward migrants by showing a video of a migrant mother and child being reunited after being separated at the U.S. southern border. Providing the combined intervention of correct DHS statistics and showing this video significantly increased empathy toward and decreased dehumanization of migrants and reduced anti-migrant policy support. Unlike in Studies 1 and 2, these effects were not moderated by political affiliation, suggesting that the manipulation affected the outcomes rather than previously held personal beliefs. Merely correcting statistical estimates or inducing empathy independently did not consistently affect any outcome measure—an effect consistent with previous research testing the efficacy of combined versus independent statistical and narrative interventions (e.g., Allen et al., 2000). The success of the combined intervention suggests that both cognitive and affective aspects of an intervention may be important for changing policy support in this context.

The current findings have several theoretical and practical implications. First, we demonstrate that both Democrats and

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**Figure 4.** Study 3, standardized path model examining successful statistical correction + video intervention versus the control, showing that the successful intervention predicts anti-migrant policy support via empathy toward migrants and dehumanization of migrants. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
Republicans overestimate migrant criminality, suggesting that overestimating criminality is not a partisan issue but rather an issue that affects all Americans. This may stem from media portrayals; for example, the media often uses dehumanizing language to describe migrants (Cisneros, 2008; Esses et al., 2008, 2013) and often perpetuates the stereotype that migrants are linked to criminality (Figueroa-Caballero, & Mastro, 2019). Interestingly, our results also suggest that while these negative portrayals are prevalent in both liberal and conservative media outlets (e.g., Fernandez & Jordan, 2019; Lankford et al., 2019; Singman, 2019), the impact they have on Democrats, who tend to be exposed to and trust liberal media outlets (e.g., Pennycook & Rand, 2019), is likely to be more consequential on subsequent attitudes and policy support. Second, these misperceptions about migrant criminality can have downstream consequences for anti-migrant policy support, which can have broader social implications. For example, given that people can be easily influenced by inaccurate information (for a review, see Rapp, 2016; Rapp & Salovich, 2018), false narratives about migrants can lead to greater exclusion of and discrimination against migrants. However, our data show that inaccurate beliefs about migrant criminality are amenable to intervention equally for both Democrats and Republicans, suggesting that disseminating accurate information and continuing to share the stories of how policies affect migrants can change people’s willingness to support anti-migrant policies.

Authors’ Note

All data and syntax can be found at https://osf.io/nwp9a/

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Supplemental Material

The supplemental material is available in the online version of the article.

Notes

1. These data were collected from a larger data set (see Study 1; Moore-Berg et al., 2020) that focused specifically on partisan attitudes; therefore, recruitment was limited to Democrats and Republicans. The data reported here were not previously examined.
2. See Supplemental Materials for all power analyses.
3. We also analyzed all results by participant ideology. These results replicated the political affiliation results and are reported in the Supplemental Materials.

References


**Author Biographies**

**Samantha L. Moore-Berg** is a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Pennsylvania and Beyond Conflict. Her main research interests include isolating the social cognitive functions that contribute to or predict prejudice and discrimination, and designing and implementing prejudice and discrimination reduction interventions. Dr. Moore-Berg received her PhD and MA in social psychology at Temple University and her BA in psychology and sociology at Florida State University.

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**Emile Bruneau** founded the Peace and Conflict Neuroscience Lab at the University of Pennsylvania. His research focused on better understanding the psychological and cognitive roots of biases driving intergroup conflicts and the effect of targeted interventions aimed at reducing these biases. Dr. Bruneau received his PhD in neuroscience at the University of Michigan and his BA in human biology at Stanford University.

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